Rules Governing Electronic Appendices and Records Amended to Ease Readability

/in , , , , , , , , /by

THE NEWS

Effective Sunday, October 1, 2017, the Florida Supreme Court’s amendments to the appellate rules go into effect.  The amendments are largely designed to update the rules to comport with the realities of producing and easily reading electronic appendices and records.

THE TRAP FOR THE UNWARY PRACTITIONER

Rule 9.220 is amended, adding new requirements for an appendix.  Now, an appendix must:

  • contain a coversheet that meets specific requirements for content;
  • contain a certificate of service;
  • generally be filed as a separate, single PDF file;
  • be properly indexed and consecutively paginated, with the cover sheet being page 1 and the page numbers matching the PDF reader display;
  • “be bookmarked, consistently with the index, such that each bookmark states the date, name of the document which it references, and directs to the first page of that document;”
  • have bookmarks “viewable in a separate window.”

Further, no condensed transcripts are permitted in an appendix without leave of court.  The rule also changes the format for paper appendices, when so authorized.

The Fourth District has warned that it will strike any appendix that does not comply with the amended rules when they go into effect on October 1, 2017.

The Fourth District has already issued an email to all 4th DCA eDCA Filers, stating “Effective October 1, 2017, electronic appendices which do not comply with the amended Rule 9.220 will be stricken.”  So be ready and be compliant!

THE SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS SUMMARIZED

9.020 – Adds a definition for “E-Filing System Docket.”

9.120 – Details the format and contents of the documents to be transmitted from the district courts to the supreme court in situations where a party is seeking discretionary review

9.141 – Removes the clerk’s exception that allowed it to avoid having to repaginate or reindex a record from a previously prepared record into a record for a collateral or postconviction criminal case.

9.200 – The record shall now be submitted as a PDF document, uploaded to the e-filing system docket, and available for download to attorneys and parties who have registered for access to the system.  The appellate court may direct the lower clerk to submit a replacement record when an original record is found to be noncompliant with the technical requirements of rule 9.200(d).

9.220 – See above.

Rules 9.160 and  9.180 contain only minor changes in terms to reflect that their respective documents are “transmitted” rather than “sent” or “filed.”

BONUS TIP FOR TRIAL LAWYERS


The fact that the new rules forbid condensed transcripts in an Appendix should send a strong signal to trial lawyers not to file them with trial courts in general. Appellate judges do a lot of reading, and citing to a condensed transcript makes it that much harder for them to find what you are talking about. They just don’t track well or lend themselves to good notetaking on an iPad or other electronic screen. And since it is all being e-filed, there is much less of an issue with killing trees. If you are filing a transcript with the trial court, file the full transcript. The appellate judges will be a lot happier when reviewing your record. And that just makes it easier for everyone to focus on the merits rather than searching for the right record cite.

THE LONG AND SHORT OF IT

Florida State Courts have come a long way since the supreme court started this e-filing journey in 2013.  There have been a few hiccups, especially with the appellate courts, but the appellate rules are really starting to come into their own.

That said, with any new rule amendment comes new opportunities for errors to be made.  If you have a case pending or about to be pending before a Florida appellate court, give DPW Legal a call so we can help you avoid any of the pitfalls.

 

First District Court of Appeal Requests Comments on Stipulated Extensions

/0 Comments/in , , , , , /by

The First District Court of Appeal is considering joining the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth districts in allowing parties to stipulate to enlargements of time in certain instances. From the First District:

The First District Court of Appeal, which is currently the only DCA that does not allow for stipulated enlargements.

Request for Comments On Consideration to Allow Stipulated Extensions of Time in Certain Cases

The First District Court of Appeal is considering adopting a court policy allowing attorneys to submit stipulated extensions of time for filing briefs in cases not requiring expedited review. To ensure full consideration of the impact of such a policy on the public and members of the Bar, the Chief Judge invites comments, which may be submitted electronically no later than August 31, 2017 to Jon S. Wheeler, Clerk of Court, at comments@1dca.org.

 

http://www.1dca.org/requestforcomments.html

Our vote is certainly yes! Let the judges focus on substantive motions rather than extension motions. No matter what your position, get your comments in before August 31st.

Voluntary Dismissal Leads to (almost) Writ of Prohibition

/0 Comments/in , , , , /by

The Third District recently confirmed that a trial court loses jurisdiction over the substance of a case once a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses under Rule 1.420(a)(1), and that with only one rare exception a Court cannot set aside such a dismissal. U.S. Bank N.A. v. Rivera, Case No. 3D15-1415 (Fla. 3d Dist. April
27, 2016) [.pdf].

The case has a complicated procedural history: The Bank initiated foreclosure in 2009, and served the defendants by publication, obtaining a default judgment. In 2011, the Bank sought to vacate and set aside that judgment, citing “irregularities in the actions taken by its former counsel,” and the Riveras, too, sought to relief from the judgment pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540. Id. at 2. In 2013, the trial court finally entered the Bank’s 1.540 motion to vacate the judgment, and shortly thereafter, the Bank voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure action. Id. at 3.

The Riveras, however, did not stop litigating. They moved to set aside the voluntary dismissal for fraud on the court, attempted to engage in discovery to uncover the fraud, and sought sanctions against the Bank for failing to comply with the discovery. The Bank eventually sought the instant writ of prohibition to stop the trial court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the dismissed case.

What is a Writ of Prohibition?

A writ of prohibition is not an appeal in the traditional sense. Rather, it is an action, on the original jurisdiction of the district court of appeal, “to prevent courts from acting when there is no jurisdiction to act.” Sutton v. State, 975 So. 2d 1073, 1076 (Fla. 2008); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(3). Here, seeking a writ of prohibition was the appropriate remedy, because the party contended that the trial court was continuing to act even though it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

Citing to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Pino v. Bank of New York, 121 So. 3d 23 (Fla. 2013), the Court ruled that the Rivera’s attempts to secure a dismissal with prejudice were not authorized by Rule 1.540. Specifically, the Court explained that “a trial court has neither the authority under rule 1.540 nor the inherent authority to grant relief from a voluntary dismissal where fraud on the court is alleged but no affirmative relief has been granted to the dismissing plaintiff.” Id. at 4-5.

Interestingly, the appellate court stopped just shy of actually issuing the writ of prohibition. When initiating a writ of prohibition, the rules require that the petitioner name the judge or lower tribunal as a “formal party to the petition” in the body of the petition, but not add the judge’s name to the caption. Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(e). The opinion ruled in favor of the petitioner, but the court stated that it would “withhold issuance of this court’s writ confident that the court below will refrain from further action in this matter.” In other words, the Court did not want to embarrass the trial judge, but ordered him or her to stop taking action in the case.