The New Rule 9.420 — Time and Service

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Coming on the heels of mandatory e-mail service, the Florida Supreme Court has revised the rules for calculation of time, to be uniform across all of the rules. See SC10-2299 (July 12, 2012) [.pdf]. As with e-mail service, the new time calculation rules are found in the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration — Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514 (Computing and Extending Time) will be your your new best friend come October 1, 2012.

New Rule 2.514 models itself somewhat after the Federal Rules’ addition of direction for calculating time periods stated in days or hours. However, it does not go so far as to entirely adopt a “days are days” philosophy:

When the period stated in days is less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.

Fla. R. Jud. Admin. Rule 2.514(a)(3)(effective Oct. 1, 2012). No doubt, this is to avoid having to go through the legislature to amend statutory calculations that were based on the old rule.

It is now official that the last day ends at midnight, at least for electronic filing and any service, which as always is a blessing and a curse for lawyers everywhere. Rule 2.514(4)(A). If filing is being done by other means (i.e., in person) the last day ends remains when the clerk’s office closes (and remember, clerk’s offices are closing earlier due to budget constraints, so be careful!). Rule 2.514(4)(B).

The new rule also clarifies what constitutes a legal holiday — before, what constituted a holiday varied between the civil rules and the appellate rules. A legal holiday is now

(A) the day set aside by section 110.117, Florida Statutes, for observing New Year’s Day, Martin Luther King Jr.’s Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans’ Day, Thanksgiving Day, the Friday after Thanksgiving Day, or Christmas Day; and
(B) any day observed as a holiday by the clerk’s office or as designated by the chief judge.

Interestingly, former case law often looked to Section 683.01, Florida Statutes, entitled “Legal Holidays”, to determine what constituted a holiday. See, e.g., Flack v. Carter, 392 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)(looking to 683.01 to determine whether electoral protest was timely filed); Turner v. State, 382 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)(legal holiday under criminal rules of procedure as defined in 683.01); Azalea Homes v. Makela, 77 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1955)(refusing to apply Section 683.01 to deem petition filed on Tuesday July 6 to be timely where it was due Monday July 5 but Sunday July 4 was the legal holiday). All of these cases are likely superseded by new Rule 2.514. One would hope that there will be less need for litigation over calculation issues with the new rule.

Finally, lawyers still get to keep their precious mailing days, even when there is service by e-mail. New Rule 2.514(b) reads:

(b) Additional Time after Service by Mail or E-mail. When a party may or must
act within a specified time after service and service is made by mail or e-mail, 5 days are added after the period that would otherwise expire under subdivision (a).

Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.514(b) (effective Oct. 1, 2012).

Coupled with the changes to the service rule, As of October 1, 2012 Fla. R. App. P. 9.420 will be an almost entirely different creature. I’ve inserted a copy of the two new Rules of Judicial Administration right after Rule 9.420 in my .pdf of the appellate rules, so that I don’t need to flip back and forth between files on my iPad when the issue comes up. Be sure to alert staff to these important changes.

Jordan Approved by Senate Executive Committee Meeting

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The nomination of Judge Adalberto J. Jordán to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals continues to move through the Senate. On October 13, 2011, the Executive Committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee met to discuss judicial nominations. The committee moved the consideration of Judge Jordán and a few other nominees en banc, and by vocal consent the Committee agreed to report all of the judges to the Senate Floor. Senator Jeff Sessions called out Judge Jordán’s qualifications (before speaking against one of the other nominees). The portion of the committee hearing discussing the nominations is found at 32:33-40:43.

After being nominated in August and questioned by the committee in September, these nominations are just breezing through the process.

“Final” Judgment While Appeal Pending is Void

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On a petition for certiorari filed by a non-party challenging a post-judgment discovery order, the Second District Court of Appeal has provided us with some great language on what constitutes a void judgment. In Gibson v. Progress Bank of Florida, No. 2D10-4137 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 23, 2011)[.pdf], the court decided what should be a fairly obvious point — that a final judgment entered while an interlocutory appeal is pending is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court and therefore void. This proposition comes directly out of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(f), which states:

In the absence of a stay, during the pendency of a review of a non-final order, the lower tribunal may proceed with all matters, including trial or final hearing; provided that the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause pending such review.

(emphasis by Court).

A final summary judgment, all parties agreed, “constitutes a final order disposing of the cause.” The Court held, therefore, that the judgment was null and void, explaining:

A void judgment is “[a] judgment that has no legal force or effect, the invalidity of which may be asserted by any party whose rights are affected at any time and any place, whether directly or collaterally…. It is incapable of being confirmed, ratified, or enforced in any manner or to any degree.”

Applying Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.560, the court concluded that there can be no discovery in aid of execution of a void judgment. Moreover, applying the general discovery rules applicable to pending actions, the court held that discovery from the Petitioners under those rules was irrelevant prior to judgment. Quashing the discovery order, the court concluded “because the final judgment is void, the Petitioners would suffer irreparable harm if forced to disclose their personal financial information.”