Mandatory E-Mail Service: Not so Fast!

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I think the Florida Supreme Court’s ears must have been burning — the Court today issued a corrected opinion [.pdf available here] accompanied by a correction notice [.pdf] changing the implementation date of the state’s new e-mail service rules from July 1, 2012 to September 1, 2012.

The implementation date is the only change — the rest of the new Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 will operate as I previously reported.

The Florida Bar announced on its main page:

The Florida Bar will provide complimentary education on the mandatory email service requirements prior to the effective date.

Moving the implementation date was a good call — folks who are used to a Federal Court practice probably have systems in place to deal with e-mail service, but those whose practice is solely in state court probably need more than a weeks’ notice to figure out office protocols to avoid e-mailed documents falling through the cracks. The July 1 date wasn’t even enough time to get the news into the Florida Bar News. And for some attorneys, the promised CLE from the Florida Bar will be very helpful.

Thank you, Florida Supreme Court!

Rehearing: A Comparison of 9.330 and 1.530

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The First District Court of Appeal recently explained the different standards for rehearing at the appellate level versus the trial level under the Florida rules, and it’s an important distinction for both trial and appellate practitioners to keep in mind. The take home lesson: Your last chance at issue preservation is a motion for rehearing, particularly for cases decided at early stages.

The case is Fitchner v. Lifesouth Community Blood Centers, Inc., ___ So.3d ___, No. 1D10–2019 (Fla. 1st DCA April 13, 2012) [.pdf]. Against the background of a complicated procedural history, the Court sets out a terrific discussion of the rehearing standards. The Fitchners sought to amend their complaint after an appellate remand dismissing their complaint, and the trial court denied their motion. With new counsel, they moved the trial court for rehearing, making a new and (as the trial court admitted) “meritorious” argument as to why the amended complaint should be allowed. The trial court nonetheless denied the motion because the argument was being raised for the first time, and had not been “overlooked” or “misapprehended.”

The First DCA ruled the Fitchners had not waived their argument. The Court started its analysis, as we all should, with the text of the rules, in this case a comparison of the text of the appellate rehearing rule, Rule 9.330(a), with the trial-level rule, Rule 1.530(a). The Appellate Rule requires that the movant:

“state with particularity the points of law or fact that, in the opinion of the movant, the court has overlooked or misapprehended in its decision, and shall not present issues not previously raised in the proceeding .”

The Civil Procedure rule, by contrast, states:

“[o]n a motion for rehearing of matters heard without a jury, including summary judgments, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, and enter a new judgment.”

Reading these rules side-by-side, the Court concluded:

“It is clear from a comparison of the text of these two rules that the standard to be applied in trial courts is much broader than the one that applies on appeal. Rule 1.530 is not limited to a mistake the court has made. To the contrary, rehearing may be granted in an appropriate case to prevent an injustice that would be caused by an error or omission by one of the lawyers.”

Trial practitioners should beware, however: Just because the trial court has the power to consider a newly raised issue on a motion for rehearing made pursuant to Rule 1.530, does not mean it is required to do so. It is still best to raise every issue in your original motion. But the trial court did have the power to consider the new argument raised, and as a result the new issue was preserved for appellate review. The Court went on to reverse the dismissal based upon the legal argument raised and rejected in the Fitchners’ motion for rehearing.

As an aside, the decision also contains helpful analysis of the law of the case doctrine. More on law of the case in a future post.

9.110(n) Amended to Conform With Statutory Change

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The Florida Supreme Court today has made an effective-immediately change to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(n) regarding the deadline for a district court to render its decision on an appeal of an order dismissing a minor’s petition for a judicial waiver of parental notice of termination of pregnancy.  [.pdf of order SC11-2372].  As of March 1, 2012, the court must render its decision no later than 7 days after transmittal of the record.  The old rule stated that an opinion had to be rendered no later than 10 days from the filing of the notice of appeal.  The change complies with the statutory requirement that the appellate court “must rule within 7 days after receipt of the appeal.”

I would call this a non-controversial rule change to comply with a very controversial statute and procedure.